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New Emphases and Techniques for
International Law-The Case of the
Boundary Dispute
Daniel Wilkes*
This article is doubly experimental. First, it uses a form chosen to
focus on how new policy and process adjustments in international law
affect inter-nation boundary situations.1 Second, it presents some adjust-
ments in a categorical, rather than a qualified fashion, to see whether new
perspectives can be gained by extending them to their full logical reach.
Further, in the form chosen each thesis is presented with an example
situation to lend concreteness to the discussion which follows.2
THESIS: Tools for settling inter-nation boundary disputes as well as the
boundary rules themselves are faulty if they tend to prevent mutual aid
between nations for any extended time, and are best adapted to modern
interdependence only when they can foster that mutual aid.
Traditional concepts of international law presumed a world in which
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essary to succeed are those in the same b
nations could be compared to
boats in a race; each boat could
move fairly only if all followed
the rules by yielding properly, by
avoiding collisions with other
boats, or by avoiding unfair
paths across the other boats'
bows. In boat races, however,
the participants in one boat
need not like another's crew;
so long as the rules of the race
are followed, the only persons
with whom cooperation is nec-
*Copyright 1964 by Daniel Wilkes.
1. A shift in emphasis from sovereign power to an international law based on concepts of
fairness, human dignity, interdependence, and maximum use of world resources is taking
place. See, e.g., MCDoUGAL & BURKE, PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 563, 564 (1962);
Chayes, Progress Towards International Law, in 1961 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMEmiCAN SO-
cIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 202, 203; Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the
Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L 279 (1963); Lester, River Pollution in
International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 828-29 (1963); Note, The Athens Conference on World
Peace Through Law, 58 AM. J INT'L L. 138, 143 (1964); Official Documents, Report of
the United Nations International Law Commission, 58 AM. J. INTL L. 241, 334 (1964).
2. A similar use of examples was most effectively employed in Van Alstyne, Justiciability
Of International River Disputes: A Study in the Case Method, 1964 DUKE L. J. 307.
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Transitional international law, on the other hand, asks that a re-
examination of rules and tools begin with an awareness that modern
nations are "in the same boat" in that the success of the peoples of one
nation demands the cooperation of others. A corollary of this proposition
is that unless some adjustments are made, some rules or tools designed to
keep the nation-boats apart may not be capable of keeping the nation-
crews pulling together.
SiTuATioN: Chile decided to construct an irrigation canal to divert up
to 47 per cent of the waters of the Chilean-Bolivian river Lauca.
Bolivia sent a diplomatic Note reserving its right to be consulted under
the 1933 Montevideo Declaration. Chile began work in 1949 from a
plan approved by a mixed commission of experts.
In 1960, Bolivia said the diversion would violate the international
law on cross-boundary rivers and insisted that work stop pending settle-
ment of the dispute. Chile, on the other hand, contended that no viola-
tion was involved and work stoppage would infringe her sovereignty;
however, she ultimately agreed to negotiate.
In 1962, the canal was ready for use. Bolvia, however, took the
dispute to the Organization of American States. She was remitted by the
OAS to seek other means of settlement; meanwhile, Chile began using
the Lauca waters. Bolivia severed relations and did not resume them
until the following year.3
This dispute is not atypical of those arising under an international
law structured upon rules governing rights in boundary disputes. Both
sides agreed that the Montevideo Declaration was the starting point;
both agreed to negotiate; both agreed that under international law Chile
could not divert a cross-boundary river if Bolivia would be seriously
harmed; and both agreed that if only minor harm would come to Bolivia,
Chile would be required to make some compensation therefor.' Their
disagreements, however, were factual and their techniques of adjustment
led to increased aggravation and a reduced mutual aid climate.
After preliminary posturing, similar to that in the Rio Lauca situa-
tion, other projects for joint use of cross-boundary rivers, such as the
Nile development scheme between the Sudan and the United Arab Re-
public, and the Indus Waters Treaty between Pakistan and India have
3. See Lecaros, International Rivers - The Lauca Case, 2 INDIAN J. INT'L L 133, 144-50
(1963).
4. See LAUTERPACHT, 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 475 (8th ed. 1955). The
requirement that negotiations must be initiated before beginning a river development in State
A which might cause "serious injury" to State B was first added in the Geneva Convention
Agreement on the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting More Than One State, art. 4, 36
L.N.T.S. 76 (1923). But see Judicial Decisions, Lake Lanoux Case (France-Spain), 53 AM.
J. INT'L L. 156, 170 (1959). For proposals to adopt a modified form of the United States
Supreme Court's "equitable apportionment test," and for the emergence of rights to propor-
tional benefits see Andrassy, Utilisation des eaux internationales non maritimes, 1959 An-
nuaire de l'Institut de Droit International 131-358. For comprehensive surveys of American
and international case law on cross-boundary river development see generally Pasha, American
Interstate River Cases as Authority in International Disputes (unpublished thesis in Michi-
gan Law School Library). See also Van Alstyne, Justiciability of International River Dis-
[Vol. 15:623
Wilkes, International Boundary Disputes
been started.5 However, these projects which resulted from conflicts
between upstream "sovereignty" and downstream "rights," were possible
only at the expense of years of diplomatic energy expended during these
postures.
This outcome is the natural, not the unexpected result. Yet, it is defi-
nitely an undesired one resulting from the older traditional international
law approaches to cross-boundary river development. Under these
approaches, if a proposal to develop a river is looked upon conceptually
as a "dispute," the four "ations" of traditional international law -
negotiation, arbitration, litigation and retaliation-pose, at the very least,
the specter of diverted diplomatic concern; and at the very worst, as in
the Rio Lauca situation, the possibility of a complete rupture of joint ef-
forts. If such unwanted results are likely, is it not fair to ask whether
merely increased refinement of dispute-settling mechanisms for this type
of problem is the desired direction in which the international law of
cross-boundary river development should go? If, on the other hand,
all developments of cross-boundary rivers are looked upon conceptually
as "exploitations of international resources," it is both possible and logical
to expect cooperative rather than adversary procedures to be brought
into play. For example, the role of the World Bank as a party to the
Indus Waters Treaty is a harbinger of what can come from such a shift
in viewpoint.' However, this would mean a large rather than a small
shift. Moreover, it would be the sort of shift that would replace inter-
nation equivalents of our own current six-state dispute7 (together with
the earlier unilateral water-diversion precedents such as the dispute in
New Jersey v. New York') with inter-nation equivalents of our Tennessee
Valley Authority.
putes: A Study in the Case Method, 1964 DUKE L.J. 307; BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1959).
5. For the text of the Indus Waters Treaty see Official Documents, Pakistan-India, Indus
Waters Treaty, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 789, 797 (1961); 1 INDIAN J. INT'L L 341 (1961). See
also Raju, Indus Waters Treaty 1960, 1 INDIAN J. INTL L. 655 (1961). Compare the final
sovereignty-oriented Niger River development scheme with the Republic of Niger's more in-
ternationally-oriented original proposals to permit the river's development by international
management in Note, The Berlin Treaty and the River Niger Commission, 57 AM. J. INT'L L.
873, 875-76 (1963).
6. See Raju, supra note 5, at 658. See also Bains, Diversion of International Rivers, 1 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 38 (1960). For an emphasis on political rather than legal results see Raju, Prin-
ciples of Law Governing the Diversion of International Rivers, 2 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 370
(1962).
7. The six states involved in the dispute are: Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, and Wisconsin. See Illinois v. Michigan, 360 U.S. 712 (1959), for the initial suit
which is now in the hands of a special master. For background on the case see Forer, Water
Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation, 75 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1961); Vallance, Settlement ot
International Boundary Waters Questions in North America, 7 CUtsos MONOGRAMCOS
(AcADEMIA INTEIRAMERICANA DE DERECHO COMPARADO Y INTERNACIONAL) 261, 280-
89 (1959) [hereinafter cited as CURSOS MONOGRAFIcOSI; Editorial Comment, The Chicago
Sanitary District Case, 22 AM. J. INTL L 837 (1928).
8. 283 U.S. 336 (1931). For other cases involving equitable apportionment situations
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It is suggested that this adversary-to-cooperative shift is required at
the present time in light of the overlapping nature of the two types of
problems raised in international boundary law, namely, problems of inter-
nation use of world resources, and problems of inter-nation exercise of
jurisdiction. To ensure better use of world resources, techniques con-
sistent with mutual aid are often vital. Therefore, those traditional tech-
niques which mar a mutual aid climate may be self-defeating. Further,
diplomatic techniques used only to adjust disputes over jurisdictional
lines, if they mar or bar a general mutual aid climate, can also prevent
better use of resources even by neighboring states whose progress depends
on such aid.
Some traditional international law techniques carry tendencies to
produce climates in which this mutual aid is less likely to occur. Since
such climates create virtually all of the bars to cooperation in time of
war, absent only its physical destruction, 9 it may well be time to identify
the techniques which lead to aid-reducing or "unfriendly" acts as incon-
sistent with emergent world public order,'" and seek to replace them
with techniques more likely to be aid-inducing or "friendly." For
example, in the Rio Lauca situation, the initial Bolivian Note was sent
to preserve a claimed "right" to be consulted on an agreed development
of the cross-boundary river Lauca. This implied that Chile had been
"wrong" in the first place to begin such a study without consultation. How-
ever, Chile insisted that she had a "right" to act unilaterally. At this
point, each diplomatic service was convinced of the other's unreasonable-
ness.
11
An exchange of diplomatic Notes insisting upon some "right" or
protesting some "wrong"-traditional as it may be-is in fact the equiv-
alent of one little boy saying: "Put up your fists!" while another boy
responds, "O.K., if that's the way you want it!" The truth is that this
is not the desired result of either party. Rather, it is hoped that the Note
will accomplish the desired end-the resumption of friendlier cooperation
by instant apologetic recognition of the ignored "right," or an end to the
violation itself. But such a Note, by its very nature, often dooms its sender
to disillusionment and reduces or ends inter-nation mutual aid.
resolved only by litigative posturing see Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); Connecti-
cut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931);
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906);
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
9. See Wilkes, Remarks, 1964 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMRICAN SoCIETY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW.
10. While this term was first used by Professor Myres McDougal in a policy context in Mc-
DOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960), and in a coercion-control context in
McDOUGAL, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961), the usefulness of such a
fresh approach suggests its extension to the development of coercion-free climates as well.
Compare McDOUGAL & BURKE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 25.
11. A similar point was reached in the dispute between Bolivia and Peru over Bolivia's
[VoL 15:623
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In the Rio Lauca situation, on Bolivia's insistence eight years later,
Chile agreed to follow the Montevideo procedure by referring the factual
questions to a mixed commission of experts. 2 In 1949, the project was
at last begun, apparently without protest. However, the two foreign
services were not through, for in 1953, a Note from Bolivia claimed that
Chile had been "wrong" not to conclude a formal agreement with Bolivia.
The Chilean response in 1954 was that such an agreement was only
required when injury to the downstream state could be deduced; it im-
plied a "right" in Chile to conclude no formal agreement and a "wrong"
in Bolivia to protest. Again, each side was convinced of the other's
unreasonableness.
Four years later the Bolivians called for a new mixed commission to
assess changes in the first plan. Thus, in 1960, renewed activity in
the Chilean foreign office resulted in a second commission which re-
ported that the modified works did not amount to a change in plan. In
short, there was a technical assessment of who was "right" and who was
"wrong" in the matter. It was not altogether surprising, therefore, to find
that a new Bolivian Note had been sent in October 1960, charging Chile
with an international law violation. Nor was it surprising to find the
Note followed by a Chilean rejoinder. However, considerable diplomatic
energy, to say nothing of mutual exasperation, ended in 1962 with Bo-
livia's reference of the dispute to the OAS. The result: Chile opened the
Lauca waters diversion, and Bolivia severed diplomatic ties. Here, Bo-
livia's very decision to take the dispute to the OAS for dispute settlement
required her to call Chile's actions "aggression." This in turn led to
Chilean "retaliation" in the form of an order to use the waters at once.
The final aid-reducing act was Bolivia's rupture of diplomatic ties."
This was not the necessary result of the "rights" posturing of tradi-
tional international law. Undoubtedly, other factors shaped these nations'
responses as well. It was, however, a foreseeable result, given the "ac-
cepted" adjustment techniques involved.
THESIs: Resort to international, political, arbitral, and judicial bodies
nay result in aid-reducing or "unfriendly" acts, rather than in aid-induc-
ing or "friendly" acts.
The experience of the Organization of American States in the Rio
Lauca trans-boundary waters dispute is illustrative of the possible need to
unilateral grant of a concession to use waters along the boundary of Lake Titicaca. In that
situation, it was Peru who protested the unilateral action while Bolivia insisted that she had
a right to take such action. See Moreno, Las explotaciones petroliferas en las fronteras in-
ternacionales, 1959 ANNUARIO HISPANO-LuSO-AMRICANO DE DEREcHo INTERNACIONAL
92, 97-98.
12. Contrast this situation with the Lake Titicaca dispute where a mixed commission was
created only after Peru's insistence.
13. See Lecaros, Internationei Rivers - The Lauca Case, 2 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 133, 145-49
(1963).
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create alternatives to accepted dispute-handling channels. As noted pre-
viously, the Rio Treaty for mutual assistance provides for collective ac-
tions against dangers to the peace. Hypothetically, this requires the for-
eign office of State B (the protesting state wishing to obtain an OAS
settlement forum) to charge State A (the diverting state) with endanger-
ing the peace, or with an act of "aggression." The Bogota Pact for peace-
ful solution of disputes provides only a few of the Rio Pact states with a
set of mechanisms less political but far less speedy.14  The irony here is
that the presumed "pacific" dispute-settlement by negotiation and arbitral
channels may bring with it the same sort of "unfriendly" aid-reducing acts
as were involved in the Rio Lauca situation, while the speedier settlement
by an immediate congress of states, such as the OAS, requires this very
aid-reducing climate as its ticket of entry. In fact, a decision other than
remittance to slower pacific procedures may require a strong outward
show of armed hostility.
SITUATION: Nicaragua and Honduras set up a mixed commission of
arbitrators to fix their boundary. The disagreeing commissioners asked
the King of Spain to fix the boundary for the final stretch of land ex-
tending to the Atlantic. In his 1906 award, the King set up a river
boundary thalweg-line from the mouth of the Rio Coco. In 1912, Nica-
ragua declared the award a nullity.
In 1957, Honduras used the river as a boundary for a new department
haply named "Gracias a Dios." In May of the same year, Honduras
cabled the OAS Council that Nicaraguan forces had "crossed" her river
boundary. Under OAS influence, both states agreed to submit their
dispute to the World Court for final settlement. The court held (14-1)
the King's award binding upon Nicaragua.15
From the standpoint of the actual military threat involved if Honduras
were to evict Nicaragua from the disputed territory, the OAS may have
initially been the appropriate organization to handle this particular
boundary problem. Understandably, the OAS sought only to resolve the
military aspects; it conceived the reference of the dispute to the World
Court as being a "pacific" resolution of a clearly aid-reducing climate
existing between two American states in sore need of cooperative action.
Nowhere is this cooperation more needed than on a long river bound-
ary such as the Rio Coco,"0 or in an area such as that made up by the
Central American States in light of their renewed aim to work toward a
14. Manger, La Organisation de los Estados Americanos, 8 CURsos MONOGRAFIGOs 13, 48
(1960).
15. For an interesting discussion of this decision see Bastid, Ls Problemes Territoriaux dans
la Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de Justice, 107 RECEUIL DES CoURs 365, 467-69
(The Hague Academy of International Law 1962). For a discussion of OAS actions see Fen-
wick, Inter-American System of Collective Security, 8 CUtsos MONOGRAFIcos 63, 84-88
(1960).
16. The Rio Coco is also known as the Rio Segovia.
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mutually beneficial common market.1 7  However, reference of this dispute
to the World Court which is now formulated by even more of the world's
most eminent jurists,"8 had the momentary effect of directing the two
foreign services to a different forum in which to assume their postures of
"right." The court's decision in confirming Honduras' "right" to the dis-
puted territory, but denying her request for additional relief, left both
parties unsatisfied; however, this was not as crucial as the fact that the
presumed "pacific" court proceedings gave rise to the same aid-reducing
or "unfriendly" climate as was produced by the initial military confronta-
tion.19
In cases involving river boundary disputes, such as the Rio Coco
situation, the old rules provide adequately-matured concepts of where the
boundary will lie. In dealing with the Rio Coco situation, the Spanish
King used the currently accepted "thalweg" or mid-channel rule. 0 This
rule which divides a river boundary in the middle of the river rather than
in the middle of its deepest navigational channel has been accepted by the
Chinese People's Republic in its recent treaties with Burma and Nepal.21
Under the "thalweg" rule, disputes are more likely to involve fact
questions such as whether the treaty adequately identified the river,
or whether the river has changed its course. For example, in cases where
a river had changed its course, the boundary may, as in the cited Chinese
treaties with Burma and Nepal, remain the same.2 The advantage of
the "thalweg" rule which permits free navigation to both co-riparians,
is thus partially lost and an element of impermanence is automatically
built into unsurveyed parts of the boundary. On the other hand, the tra-
ditional rule provides that the boundary line will remain the same if a
river changes its course suddenly, but will move with the river if it changes
its course slowly. This rule opens up yet a different kind of dispute. A typi-
17. Similar efforts toward a Central American Union have been tried since 1823 without
enduring success. See IRELAND, BOUNDARIES, PossEssIoNs AND CONFLICrS IN CENTRAL
AND NORTH AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 73-79 (1941).
18. See Fenwick, Inter-American System of Collective Security, 8 CuRsos MONOGRAFICOS
63, 88 (1960). For a further discussion on the respective memorials of the parties see 1 CASE
CONCERNING THE 1906 ARBITRAx AwARD MADE BY THE KING OF SPAIN - PLEADINGS,
ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOcUmENTS 62, 203-04 (I.C.J. 1960). For the oral argument
of Mr. Sanson-Teran in this case see id. at 213-19, for the reply of M. Rolin see id. at 482-83.
19. As of June 1964, the Honduran government still occupied part of the territory under
dispute.
20. Cf. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S.
158 (1918). For an illustration of early British adoption of this rule, see the Law Officer's
reports on the Argentinian river boundary in 1847 reported in MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL
LAW OPINIONS 302 (1956).
21. For the text of these treaties see 1 INDIAN J. INT'L L 695 (1961). However, The 1963
Chinese People's Republic Treaty with Pakistan retains the older "middle of the riverbed"
line which is still the rule elsewhere for non-navigable streams. See Official Documents,
People's Republic of China-Pakistan-Agreement on the Boundary Between Chinas Sinkiang
and the Contiguous Areas, 57 Am. J. INT'L L 713 (1963).
22. Ibid.
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cal example is the dispute in the Chamizal Tract Arbitration between the
United States and Mexico. There, the United States refused to accept a
1911 mixed commission finding that part of the changed course was due
to accretion and part to sudden changes of direction.' This created a
grievance which, until a recent agreement to relocate the river itself was
obtained,24 taxed diplomatic relations between the two neighbors for over
half a century.
From these cases and disputes on river boundary locations, two
facts bearing on our mutual-aid emphasis emerge. First, the place of
the boundary (mid-center v. mid-channel) and the rule for change of
course (remain-the-same v. shift-with-the-river) can readily be handled in
boundary agreements, or by recourse to adequate precedents. To the
extent that provisions in boundary treaties attempt to establish ground
rules in advance, they appear to cut down the temptation of the parties
to obtain a favorable judicial sanction for some other rule during aid-
reducing or "unfriendly" court proceedings.25 It should be borne in
mind, however, that observance of such rules does not always carry
with it a willingness to restrain self-interest. For example, a continued
"thalweg" rule presumes that the navigational rights will remain of
primary importance to both countries. Is this necessarily true? Where
would the primary interest lie if a change in the river's course were to lay
bare a rich ore deposit? It might be well to reappraise the provisions
for reference of long "pacific" struggles to legal channels. Possibly the
priority interest in mutual aid has now come to carry with it a priority in-
terest in fixity of boundaries. Under favorable mutual aid, navigational
interests could be secured irrespective of the boundary line. But, the prob-
lem would be to develop an international waterway administration to se-
cure navigational interests during periods of tension between the two
states. Without such an administration, the change in favor of fixed
boundaries intended to avoid disruptions of needed joint activity would
bring the possibility of new disputes and new types of disruptions.
Second, once the rules themselves are agreed upon, the nature of these
disputes shifts to fact questions. Several consequences flow from this
shift. For instance, when a negotiation between foreign services or a
case before an arbitral body is pending, the assumption of adversary
postures on the facts involved (the "put up your fists" attitude) still
23. For the minutes of the meeting of the Joint Commission on the Chamizal Arbitration
see Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, The Chamizal Arbitration
Between the United States and Mexico, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 812 (1911).
24. For the text of the Convention for the Solution of the Problems of the Chamizal see
Official Documents, United Nations Report of the International Law Commission, 58 AM. J.
INT'L L. 241, 336 (1964).
25. If the treaty provision conflicts with precedent, it will supersede the general international
law rule. Case of the Diversion of Waters from the River Meuse, P.CI.J., ser. A/B, No.
70 (1937).
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tends to reduce the mutual aid climate between the boundary nations.
This position was presented in the Honduras-Nicaragua situation.2" Thus,
no advance ground rules in treaties or speedy legal decisions interpreting
the applicable rules will dissipate disagreements over the facts in time to
avoid disrupting on-going cooperative efforts. In most cases, a treaty
agrees either to the rule itself or to a method of settling disputes. 7 Con-
sequently, only a new mechanism which combines the settlement of the
boundary with on-going mutual aid programs, can serve to increase joint
development between neighbors consistent with international law and
the preservation of peace.28
It is true that where there is a strong historical bond between adjoin-
ing states, a given boundary dispute may not prevent joint projects from
going forward. For instance, an outstanding dispute over the diversion
by the City of Chicago of some of Lake Michigan's Canadian-American
boundary waters29 did not prevent the building of the St. Lawrence Seaway;
nor did it interfere with completion of recent plans to develop the Co-
lumbia River whose basin lies partly in British Columbia, Canada, and
partly in the American states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Mon-
tana."' However, even in such instances some of each nation's reservoir
of diplomatic energy and talent must, under existing techniques, be di-
verted to the outstanding dispute. Finally, it cannot be estimated whether
a more cooperative climate might have existed if there had been some
mechanism available to eliminate "rights" posturing.
THEsIs: Arbitral and judicial tribunals are least likely to risk aid-reduc-
ing or "unfriendly" climates when the disputes are ones in which:
(a) friction between the parties is, at the beginning, the lowest, and
(b) the stakes are lowest in terms of the economic value, strategic value,
and population of the place in dispute.
It does not follow from the preceding arguments about the aid-reduc-
ing acts that can accompany traditional resort to diplomatic Notes or in-
ternational courts, that boundary disputes should never be laid before the
World Court. In some cases, it may be clear to all that the relations be-
26. See note 15 supra.
27. For a comprehensive schedule of treaties and conventions for multi-nation inland
waterways and boundary waters see OGILVIE, INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 180-380
(1920); Note, Survey of Agreements Providing for Third-Party Resolution of International
Waters Disputes, 55 AM. J. INT'L. L 645-69 (1961).
28. Cf. the text of the Indus Waters Treaty in Official Documents, Pakistan-India, Indus
Waters Treaty, 55 A. J. INT'L L 789, 797 (1961).
29. See Valiance, Settlement of International Boundary Waters Questions in North America,
7 CUiRSOS MONOGRAFICOS 280-89 (1959).
30. Id. at 301.
31. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1964, p. 1, col. 1. But see, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1964, p. 1, col. 4,
wherein development projects on the Missouri River to stabilize its course have left a dis-
puted boundary between Nebraska and Iowa now at suit before the United States Supreme
Court. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1964, p. 1, col. 4. Compare Bourne, The Columbia River Con-
troversy, 37 CAN. B, REV. 444 (1959).
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tween the states involved are so strained that recourse to the World Court
will increase the frictions and thus ultimately prevent needed joint activ-
ity." Also, in some cases it may be equally clear that the diverting or possess-
ing state considers the water use or place in dispute so valuable that a
legal decision against its interest would be flouted. Here again, resort to
the World Court would only intensify the hostile climate and erode the
consensual underpinnings of international law. In other cases, however,
resolution of the dispute by the World Court may be the only means of
reestablishing an aid-inducing or "friendly" climate where diplomacy
has failed or where no combined development and dispute settlement body
exists.3"
SiTuATIoN: In 1904, Cambodia (through France) and Thailand (then
Siam) decided by treaty to run their boundary from a river's mouth
to follow successively: the left shore of a lake, a parallel going east, a
river, a meridian, the watershed line along one mountain chain (the
Pnom Dang Rek), the crest line of another range, and the Mekong
River. A mixed commission's surveyors were to map out the exact line.
In 1907, Thailand had a French team map out the line. This map,
like those used by Thailand in negotiations up to 1958, showed the
Buddhist temple on the Preah Vihear cliff in the Dang Rek range as lo-
cated in Cambodia.
When Thailand claimed the temple on the ground that the watershed
line went to the edge of the promontory instead of the map line, Cam-
bodia protested, whereupon the Thais sent a squad of soldiers to the
temple. Cambodia laid the dispute before the World Court. The court
held (9-3) that the treaty's aim of final stability demanded adherence
without protest to the boundaries set by the maps, even if they did not
show the true watershed line.34
The Mekong Basin project in Southeast Asia is one of the most prom-
ising ever essayed. It has potentials for flood control, irrigation, and
electricity exceeding the Tennessee Valley project in the United States.
It promises to tap unexploited timber tracts and deposits of phos-
32. Compare in this respect the views of the majority justices in the Northern Cameroons Case,
[1963] I.C.J. Rep. 15, reported in Judicial Decisions, Case Concerning the Northern Cam-
eroons (Cameroons v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 488
(1964), with the discussion in Gross, Limitations Upon the Judicial Function, 58 AM. J.
INT'L L. 415 (1964).
33. Cf. Official Documents, Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Respecting
Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, 4 AM. J. INTL L. 239 (Supp. 1910).
The International Joint Commission which was set up by the Boundary Waters Treaty with
Great Britain adjudicates disputes over boundary water usage under principles of international
law. In its Report on the Pollution of Boundary Waters, the Commission was unable to
assess the rights or wrongs involved; it became convinced that the waters flowing between
the United States and Canada should be treated as a shared natural resource. See Lester,
supra note 1, at 843.
34. Temple of Preah Vihear Case, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 6, discussed in Bastid, Les Problemes
Territoriaux dans la jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de justice, 107 RECEUIL DES
COURS 365, 467-69 (The Hague Academy of International Law 1962); Weissberg, Maps as
Evidence In International Boundary Disputes: A Reappraisal, 57 AM. J. INT'L. L. 781, 792-98
(1963); JENNINGs, AcQuIsmoN OF TERRrrORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1963).
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phates, iron, tungsten, and tin. However, before these potentialities can
be exploited, both an end to hostilities in the region and a sustained cli-
mate of mutual aid among Burma, Laos, Thailand, South Viet Nam, and
Cambodia must be achieved. While the exact apportionment of borders
has been modified since 1904, natural boundary provisions are still the
rule in Southeast Asia. Today, the Mekong River forms part of the
Burma-Laos and Thailand-Laos boundaries, while the Dang Rek range
still forms part of the northern boundary between Thailand and
Cambodia.
At first glance, use of "fixed" natural mountain boundaries appears to
have solved all problems by clear references to the watershed line for one
boundary and the crest line for the other. Use of general international
law rules with respect to a watershed line follows a natural division of
waters. This line is obtained by establishing the points at which waters
on one side flow into one state and waters on the other side flow into the
other state. Thus, disputes over upstream use or diversion are avoided from
the inception. The advantage of using the crest line, especially where no
clear watershed division is present, is that it is readily susceptible to ob-
jective determination and is more easily surveyed. However, the Temple
Preah Vihear case " demonstrates that, even here, a difference between
two maps or surveys can feed the fires of dispute. As noted previously,
the existence of agreed rules does not avoid disputes; rather, it changes
their nature into factual questions. Thus, unless the location of these
mountain boundaries can be definitely established for all time, the very
mechanisms developed for handling such disputes will determine whether
climates favorable to on-going mutual aid can survive.
In the example situation noted above, the river boundaries along the
1904 Treaty border seem, at first glance, to pose familiar shift-of-course
and line-of-division problems. The use of a river mouth as a starting
point is normally readily suited, in the case of a navigable river, to
the "thalweg" mid-channel rule,3" and in the case of a non-navigable
river, to the mid-point rule.3" Also, possible diversion of waters from
a boundary river seems, at first, to pose no problems not already dis-
cussed. However, looking at diversion of waters solely in terms of tradi-
tional diverting and protesting states obscures the fact that best river
basin use may require changes in the course of the boundary river itself.
For example, changing a river's course to take advantage of a nearby
drop in altitude for added hydroelectric power 8 may require functional
rather than legal adaptations. Further, if the plan includes locks for
35. JENNINGS, op. cit. supra note 34.
36. See I.AtJEPAcHT, I OPPENHEim'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 475, 532-33 (8th ed. 1955).
37. See id. at 532.
38. Cf. Lake Lanoux Case (France-Spain), supra note 4, where Electricite de France proposed
a diversion from the Carol River to the Ariege River to take advantage of such a drop.
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navigation, the "thalweg" mid-channel rule's priority for navigational
interests might, under traditional analysis, support a decision for a
boundary shift. On the other hand, if this shift would change the alle-
giance of a populous town, a strategic outpost,39 or a traditional sacred
place,4" the decision might apply the "Chamizal" rule which provides that
sudden changes of a river's course leave the boundary undisturbed."
Viewing these problems along such traditional sovereignty-oriented,
dispute-centered lines anticipates artificial bars to mutual aid arising dur-
ing negotiations or submissions. This will be true whether they occur in
the formative stage of a plan or after it is underway with the outstand-
ing issues unresolved. This delay, however, is at odds with transitional
international law's commitments to harness these resources for the com-
mon good.42
Illustrative of the conflict between traditional and transitional inter-
national boundary law analysis is the 1904 lakeshore boundary in the
Temple Preah Vihear situation. Suppose new dams along the Mekong
River would affect shorelevels of the Great Lake referred to in the treaty.
When the treaty's drafters referred to this shoreline, they presumed that
they had used a fixed natural boundary. Their use of the shoreline, in-
stead of the mid-line of the lake (which would apply in the absence of
any treaty)43 may have been due to customary occupation of the lake by
the Thai, or to a desire to avoid the difficulty of determining the mid-line.
There are actually, however, many such shorelines, depending upon
whether the lake is in its full or its drained state.44 Thus, the "fixed" line
is in reality, when motive to dispute it exists, as subject to factual dispute
as any other.
While instances where a treaty refers to a fictitious or unfixed natural
39. Cf. St. Croix Arbitration (United States v. Great Britain), 2 MOORE'S INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATIONS 367 (1929), involving a dispute under the Jay Treaty of 1794 to place the
Canadian-American boundary along the Schoodiac River, in part because this line left the
British military post at Presque Isle in English territory.
40. Cf. Note of A. H. McMahon, the British plenipotentiary to Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan
plenipotentiary, March 24, 1914, to mark the final frontier between India and Tibet so as to
include two sacred places in Tibet if they fell within a day's march of the British side of the
frontier. Sino-Indian Boundary 33 (1962).
41. Compare the Chamizal arbitrators' award, reported in Judicial Decisions Involving
Questions of International Law, The Chamizal Arbitration Between the United States aad
Mexico, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 812 (1911), with the solution reached in the Convention
for the Solution of the Problems of the Chamizal, Official Documents, United Nations Report
of the International Law Commission, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 336 (1964), which changed
the river channel and boundary while safeguarding titles and citizenship for those in formerly-
held territory.
42. Cf. INDIAN CONSTITuTION, art. 39, which makes the "proper distribution of the material
resources of the Community for the common good" a directive principle having influence
on the courts. PYLEE, INDIA'S CONSTITUTION 144-45, 151-52 (1962).
43. See LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. svpra note 4, at 533.
44. In the November-May dry season, the Great (or Tonle) Lake's area is about 1150 square
miles; during the summer floods, this area triples. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2149 (3d
ed. 1963).
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boundary are becoming rarer,45 men will, in the future, be able to change
natural river or lake boundaries more frequently through the use of mod-
em technology.46 Moreover, as the use of subsoil resources increases, the
importance of these boundaries and therefore the likelihood of disputes
over them increases.
The real lesson of the Temple Preah Vihear situation is not that
natural boundaries in treaties must yield to later maps and other
conduct of the parties; rather, it is that today our mutual aid needs to place
a higher priority upon boundary stability than upon the original natural
boundaries themselves. One possible step, then, in the growth of transi-
tional international boundary law might be the fixing of all boundaries
by surveys conducted under international supervision. Whatever may be
the present impracticabilities of such a project, any long-range alternative
to the aid-reducing or "unfriendly" character of readily foreseeable bound-
ary conflicts should warrant further attention. However, corollary de-
velopments will be needed. These might include: (1) internationalized
administration of certain water resources to ensure unhampered use of
river and lake highways;47 (2) a shift from littoral "sovereign" rights,
subject only to servitudes in others, to freedom of use subject to limited
servitudes in the littoral state; and (3) further growth of new techniques
to share benefits with other states, not necessarily co-riparians.48
The Mekong Basin flood control measures could alter river channels
from their present boundary courses. Under traditional riparian sover-
eignty rules, where the river is a boundary, the "thalweg" rule guaranteed
unhampered trips from either bank. By contrast, unhampered movement
of other riparians became dependent upon "internationalization" prin-
ciples which placed servitudes or right-of-use limits on sovereign control
from the banks.49 It has been advocated by some writers that both tradi-
tional priorities for navigational uses at the cost of ignoring non-naviga-
tional ones, and for littoral states at the cost of subordinating interests
of non-riparians, must be reevaluated."
45. In the St. Croix River Arbitration, supra note 39, it was discovered that the "highlands,"
referred to in the Jay Treaty of 1794 which were thought to divide distinct St. Lawrence and
Atlantic watersheds, were non-existent.
46. The present conflict between the diverting state and other shore states along the North
American Great Lakes area is illustrative of the conflicts which arise in such a situation. See
note 7 supra and accompanying text.
47. Compare existing acceptance of free transit rights on international rivers in IAUTERPACHT,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 470, with historical resistance to the pleas of Rivier, Caratheodory,
and Calvo for free navigation on International lakes and seas in LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 477-78.
48. Illustrative of this situation is the recent agreement by the United States to pay Canada
for a share of the power from the American loop of the Kootenai River as it passes through
Montana. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1964, p. 12, cols. 3-4.
49. See generally LAuTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 470.
50. See Johnson, Freedom Of Navigation For International Rivers: What Does It Mean?
62 M1cH. L Rnv. 465, 483 (1964).
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For Mekong boundary changes, the most meticulous advance planning
will still leave the seeds of future disputes of a type that cannot be settled
by existing international law rules and techniques. To pose but one such
problem we need only to ask: Is the "thalweg" rule necessarily adequate
for a court adjudication here, even though there were no vital interests at
stake to increase the likelihood of an aid-reducing climate? Suppose, for
example, the location in dispute poses a conflict between ease of navigation
and sovereignty over tungsten deposits. Will the traditional techniques
for negotiating or litigating the boundary dispute permit the on-going
mutual aid needed to exploit both? Questions such as these call for a
second look, not just at particular rules such as the "thalweg" rule, but
also at the framework of international law which has been constructed
to handle boundary river problems. A second look, for example, might
yield a conclusion that there is something about international rivers that
necessarily lends them to international rather than national exploitation.
Current development projects, however, are grounded in "sovereignty"
adjustment thinking.5 Thus, we can expect boundary river problems to
be heightened with increased use of water resources.
More than ever, therefore, mutual aid needs demand that the tools of
international law be those which permit rather than impede the fulfil-
ment of these needs. Diplomatic posturing and submission of disputes
to the World Court should be considered possible tools only when their
use will not unreasonably risk a deeper rift or create an aid-reducing di-
mate. It is submitted that such a risk is least likely where the boundary
dispute involves an area with (1) no vital strategic interests of the state
in possession, (2) no important resources, (3) little population, and
(4) little friction between the protesting state and the state in possession.
For example, in the Temple Preah Vihear situation, Thailand had sta-
tioned a squad of men on the temple grounds for "claim" rather than for
"defense" purposes. The miniscule area of the promontory between the
surveyed boundary line and the edge of the cliff claimed as the true water-
shed line by Thailand, had no known deposits of important minerals
found elsewhere in those countries. The only population involved con-
sisted of isolated temple keepers. Even here, however, there was a genu-
ine risk of harm to prospective cooperation in view of the general flux of
rapprochements between the two governments involved. If ownership of
the temple were their only outstanding grievance, the three other factors
would warrant the small risk of aid-reduction from legal postures
assumed under traditional procedures. An even greater rapprochement
between two Benelux partners, Belgium and the Netherlands, accom-
51. Compare the sovereignty orientation of the non-boundary river Niger's development
discussed in Note, The Berlin Treaty and the River Niger Commission, 57 AM. J. INT'L L
873, 875-76 (1963).
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panied successful adjudication of their dispute over several small areas
which were surrounded by Dutch territory and had a long history of
Belgian administration.52
Quite a different situation is posed, however, where the possession of
the disputed area carries with it unilateral control over a river's mouth,
as in the Rio Coco case,53 or unilateral control of passes and connecting
roads such as was involved in the Sino-Indian boundary dispute."4 Ad-
mittedly, India's situation in the latter dispute is sui generis in terms of
traditional international law, especially in view of the flexible attitude of
the Chinese People's Republic toward mapped borders existing prior to
"liberation.""
Disputes as to the location of a mountain or river boundary, like those
arising over cross-boundary waters, involve aid-reducing or "unfriendly"
acts, every bit as uncooperative as those that occur in time of war; war's
physical devastations are, however, absent in the others. The difference
is that the violence of war has been looked upon as evil. In wartime,
bomb damage can clearly be seen; the shift in battle lines can be marked
with small flags. Advances toward and retreats from a joint aid climate
cannot, however, be marked." Yet, South America has gone for long
periods with 23 per cent of its boundary lines unsettled."7 Moreover,
the Central American-Caribbean region has also gone for even longer
periods with 50 per cent of its boundary lines unsettled. "8 Even in the
absence of wars between these nations, peace has not always insured the
absence of bars to greater cooperation caused by the very on-going nature
of their boundary disputes.
52. Case concerning sovereignty over Certain Frontier Lands [1959J I.C.J. Rep. 229, dis-
cussed in Bastid, Les Problemes Territoriaux dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale
do Justice, 107 RECEUIL DES Cours 462-86 (The Hague Academy of International Law
1962).
53. See note 15 supra and accompanying text
54. See generally Krishna Rao, Sino-Indian Boundary Question: A Study of Some Related
Legal Issues, 3 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 151 (1963); Krishna Rao, Sino-Indian Boundary Ques-
tion and International Law, 11 INT'L & COMP. L Q. 375 (1962); Krishna Rao, Title to Ter-
ritory, 2 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 200 (1962). For the Chinese position that Chinese attacks were
in "self-defense" see Mao Sun, Final Settlement of Sino-Nepalese Boundary Question, PEKING
REV. 11 (Jan. 25, 1963).
55. See Weissberg, supra note 34, at 799-801.
56. The mapping techniques used in traditional warfare could well be adapted to the "war
for cooperation" necessary to develop mutual aid between nations. The dramatic device utilized
by generals who mark the advance or retreat of military forces on a strategic map with colored
pins might well be employed to record events and actions which raise or reduce the mutual aid
climate between nations in a given geographical area.
57. As late as 1941 these borders were: Argentina-Paraguay, Argentina-Uruguay, Bolivia-
Chile, Colombia-Peru, Ecuador-Peru, and British Guiana-Surinam. IRELAND, op. cit. supra
note 17, at V.
58. As late as 1941 these borders were: Costa Rica-Nicaragua, Costa Rica-Panama, Dominican
Republic-Haiti, Guatemala-British Honduras, Honduras-Salvador, and Honduras-Nicaragua.
IRELAND, op. cit. supra note 17. See also notes 16, 18, 19 supra.
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PROPOSALS
1. Tools for adjusting boundary disputes must include new devices
to replace those traditional devices which create unwarranted risks of
"unfriendly" climates, that is, those which mar joint inter-nation aid. For
example, protest Notes and their equivalents force states to take unfriend-
ly positions. Such unfriendliness cannot be afforded today between states
whose mutual efforts are needed for their own survival. This is particu-
larly true of boundary disputes which, by their very nature, arise between
those states most suited for joint efforts. In addition, other adjustment
channels must be found to serve in the many situations in which foreign
services have traditionally resorted to diplomatic channels of negotiation
and protest based on "rights" and "wrongs." Some of the channels which
are available at the present time are: (a) the offices of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations; (b) the World Bank; (c) the regional
development bodies; and (d) the non-governmental organizations which
have built up reservoirs of trust and cooperation with the infringing na-
tion. In some cases these are corporations, unions, or a common friend
respected by leaders in both nations' governments.
2. The risk of creating aid-reducing climates from legal postures of
"right" and "wrong" is lowest in matters which are generally considered
by the losing nation as being of less importance. Thus, greater use
should be made of the World Court for dispute-settlement in those
cases in which non-vital disputes, whether boundary or otherwise, are
involved. Disputes over boundaries are most likely to be non-vital if
the parties are on relatively close terms and the stake at issue is lowest
in terms of its economic, strategic, or population value. This does not
prevent any nation from conscious - and in that sense calculated -
reduction in use of the "critical interests involved" formula for diplo-
matic thinking about its own disputes. It must not, however, misjudge
the risks involved if it submits issues on a "rights" basis to negotiation
or to the World Court where the other nation is in possession and con-
siders a vital interest of its own to be involved.
3. Increased use of the World Court for dispute-settlement may
become more feasible if it is accompanied by a shift from "rights-
oriented" to "solution-oriented" presentations. Such a shift has occurred
in our own domestic law practices in the negligence area. There, our
adversary attorneys are more solution-conscious than rights-conscious.
They have, for the most part, come to accept opposing arguments about
liability as merely a prelude to an amicable settlement that "solves" the
injured person's problem without insisting on older concepts of "honor"
and legal - by which we mean "abstract" - rights.
4. Priorities favoring joint resource use should replace older sov-
ereign action rules with respect to boundary and cross-boundary river
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and lake water use. Also, a custom of co-development schemes by inter-
nation or even world bodies should replace concepts of unilateral use sub-
ject to co-user rights. Such a custom in international law would avoid
the "unfriendly" or aid-reducing acts associated with rules directed to
protection against harm from unilateral development instead of the "pull-
ing together" which modern joint aid demands. It is conceivable that a
regional or world waters development body with (a) pooled experience,
(b) pooled economic resources, (c) proven impartiality, and (d) the
ability to represent littoral, co-riparian interests could be entrusted with
river or lake developments on a use-centered, rather than a rights-cen-
tered basis.
5. The fact must be accepted that functional rather than legal solu-
tions may be required for certain boundary disputes. The "thalweg" mid-
channel rule's priority for navigational interests, for example, may not
meet equitable tests of fairness in particular cases. Also, this may be
especially true where legal posturing will delay or even prevent the
joint development of shared resources under dispute.
6. It is also suggested that in particular instances the swift con-
sensual solutions of a congress of nations - whether regional or through
the General Assembly - may be preferable to negotiation or court chan-
nels. In other instances, a swift non-political determination by an inter-
nationalized development body may avoid the aid-reduction of "un-
friendly" traditional posturing.
7. A major step toward pacific "pulling together" might include
regional or global "once-and-for-all" boundary surveys under internation-
al supervision. Such a step is particularly vital in South and Central
America, and Southeast Asia where repeated boundary disputes could mar
projects calculated to end needless poverty through resource development.
These surveys, accompanied where possible by the actual marking of
boundaries, might be entrusted to a United Nations Boundary Commis-
sion, subject to some appellate review whether by the World Court or
by the Political Committee of the Assembly. In addition, boundaries ac-
cepted at the present time by both sides could easily be made permanent,
subject of course to improved devices for shared uses and shared benefits
from present fluctuating natural boundaries.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis shows the manner in which diplomatic or
legal posturing places stumbling blocks in the way of existing plans for
joint activities, and inhibits the growth of climates in which new joint
projects will mature. The realization that this can and does happen is
not new. It is suggested, however, that those international law techniques
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which lead to the aid-reducing climates may no longer be valid in our
time, no matter how sanctioned by custom they may be.
Techniques such as diplomatic exchanges of Notes, negotiations based
upon international law "rights" and "wrongs," settlement of disputes by
memorials and counter-memorials before arbitration courts or the World
Court, are imbedded in our thinking about international law. When they
succeed in preserving a mutual aid climate, it is partially due to the very
fact of their acceptance as the "custom of the trade" in dispute-settlement.
There are still many situations in which this two-pronged result may be
achieved. It is suggested, however, that when they "succeed" in reducing
strife between nations to non-violent levels without creating or preserv-
ing a mutual aid climate, it ought to be recognized that success has not
really been achieved after all. The nation-boats have only been kept
apart; the nation-crews have not learned to like each other.
